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Equal Rights to Trade and Mediate
Introduction: Characterizing Walrasian Equilibria
Walrasian equilibrium is known to exist for a broad class of economic environments, described by endowments, consumption sets, and preference profiles. The mapping from such environments to the set of Walrasian equilibria is an obvious example of a social choice rule. As is well known, such a rule selects Pareto efficient allocations satisfying a number of appealing properties such as individual rationality, anonymity, envy-free net trades, belonging to the core, etc.
Despite the prominence of this "Walrasian" social choice rule, there is still no completely satisfactory characterization of this rule by its social choice properties, at least for economies with a fixed finite number of agents.
1 Under standard assumptions, "non-oligarchic" Pareto efficient allocations can be characterized as
Walrasian equilibria, but with lump-sum transfers -see Hammond (1998a) , which uses ideas due to Arrow (1951) and McKenzie (1959 McKenzie ( , 1961 in particular. Allocations in the core have similar properties. Walrasian equilibria without lump-sum transfers, however, are characterized by being Pareto efficient only in single consumer economies, unless further restrictions are imposed.
In economies with a continuum of agents, there are several characterizations of Walrasian equilibrium without transfers. Of these, the best known is the core (Aumann, 1964), which is related to the notion of the bargaining set (Mas- Colell, 1989 ). There are also the value allocations considered by Aumann and Shapley (1974) . With smooth preferences, an alternative characterization combines Pareto efficiency, and either anonymity or individual rationality, together with strategyproofness or envy-free net trades -see Hammond (1979) , Laroque (1981, 1982) . Walrasian equilibrium allocations without lump-sum transfers can also be characterized by multilateral strategyproofness (Hammond, 1987 (Hammond, , 1999 ), or as f -core allocations (Hammond, Kaneko and Wooders, 1989; Hammond, 1995b ). In the presence of "widespread externalities" the f -core property even characterizes Nash-Walrasian equilibria which are only constrained Pareto efficient given the extent of the externalities (Hammond, 1995a) .
1 See Maniquet (1999) for a recent alternative characterization -apart from Gevers (1986) -which does apply to a fixed finite set of agents.
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All these characterizations of Walrasian equilibria without transfers rely on individual agents lacking any power to influence prices, as is the case in a continuum economy. With a fixed finite set of agents, on the other hand, Makowski, Ostroy and Segal (1999) show how strategyproof mechanisms which are individually rational or anonymous must give Walrasian equilibria without transfers in a special class of environments where agents lack the power to influence prices, at least locally.
This is because at least one consumer has a locally flat indifference surface, treating all goods as perfect substitutes, in effect.
Other characterizations of Walrasian equilibrium without transfers involve a finite but variable set of agents. The first and best know example is the Debreu/Scarf (1963) limit theorem on the core of a replica economy -or more precisely, the result that Walrasian equilibria without transfers are the only allocations that remain in the core no matter how often the economy is replicated. Less well known are the interesting results due to Sonnenschein (1974) , Jordan (1982) and Thomson (1988) in particular -the latter paper also ends with a useful survey of numerous important results. In this connection, note that characterizations of Walrasian equilibrium consumption allocations with "equal split" -i.e., when aggregate endowments are shared equally -are easily adapted to characterizations of Walrasian equilibrium allocations of net trades, where everybody is effectively endowed with a zero net trade vector before trade starts. For example, compare the results of Hurwicz (1979) and Thomson (1979) .
2 A similar conclusion would hold in some special economies with production as well as exchange. For example, suppose that there is a single scarce factor of production (such as labour), and that every commodity except the primary factor is produced under constant returns to scale, without any joint production. These assumptions allow one to apply the non-substitution theorem that was originally proved in the contributions by Georgescu-Roegen, Samuelson, and Arrow to Koopmans (1951) , then more generally by Karlin (1959, Section 8.5 ) and Mirrlees (1969) . This result states that each commodity except the primary factor has a price proportional to the amount of the single scarce factor used directly or indirectly in its production -as in the labour theory of value. So all price ratios are independent of demand. Vind (1977) . This no envy criterion can be interpreted as giving all agents equal rights to trade. When rights to trade include the rights to multiple proportional trades, there must be a linear subspace which serves as a common budget set that decentralizes the resulting allocation, as shown in Section 3. However, this subspace could be of low dimension -even zero, for the autarky allocation, which grants such equal rights trivially.
In Section 4, it is shown that Pareto efficiency combined with equal rights to trade characterizes Walrasian equilibrium without transfers when either: (i) there are only two goods; or (ii) at least one consumer has a unique hyperplane supporting the indifference curve at the chosen allocation. Section 5 provides a counterexample
showing that this characterization does require one of the two extra conditions to hold. 
Preliminaries
Let N be a finite set of consumers, and G a finite set of physical commodities. Let
Assume that each consumer i ∈ N has a closed convex set T i ⊂ R G of feasible net trade vectors which has 0 as an interior point. Let T N denote the Cartesian product set i∈N T i . Then the set of feasible allocations is
which is assumed to be bounded and so, because it is obviously a closed subset of the finite dimensional space R NG , must be compact. Finally, assume that each consumer i ∈ N has a (complete and transitive) preference ordering i on T i satisfying local non-satiation, convexity and continuity.
denote the set of preferred incremental net trades v which improve the net trade
For each possible set of feasible allocations A and each preference profile
which there exists an equilibrium price vector p ∈ R G \ {0} with the property that for all i ∈ N , one has pt i ≤ 0 and alsot 
The following two simple results will be useful in later sections: 
Proof. If L is a subspace of dimension #G − 1, it is a hyperplane through the origin with normal
Because each individual i ∈ N has the right to trade within B p , it follows that
Pareto Efficiency
So far, equal rights to multiple proportional trade are consistent with the common budget space B being a low dimensional subspace -in fact, even B = {0} is possible, with enforced autarky. Supplementing equal rights to trade with Pareto efficiency avoids this trivial case, unless autarky happens to be Pareto efficient anyway. This leads to our first two characterization results.
Theorem 1. Suppose there are two only goods, while the feasible allocationt N ∈ A is Pareto efficient and offers equal rights to multiple proportional trade. Then
Proof. The first case is when L(t N ) has dimension zero. Thent N is the autarky allocation 0 N . By hypothesis,t N = 0 N is Pareto efficient. Because of the assumption that 0 belongs to the interior of each T i , the standard argument discussed in Section 2 establishes the existence of a price vector p = 0 such that, for each i ∈ N ,
this case. Since both sets are non-empty and convex, there exists a separating hyperplanẽ
Because L is a linear subspace, one also hasp v ≥ c for all v ∈ L and, in addition, Proof. Suppose that there is at least one consumer h ∈ N who has unique supporting prices p = 0 at the allocationt N ∈ A, as well as equal rights to multiple 
A Counterexample
The following example demonstrates the need for extra hypotheses of the kind used in the last two results. That is, if #G ≥ 3 and there are multiple supporting prices for all consumers, then adding Pareto efficiency to equal rights to multiple proportional trade may not be enough to ensure that the allocation is a Walrasian equilibrium without transfers.
The example has two consumers, so N = { 1, 2 }, and three commodities, so
Each consumer's feasible set of net trade vectors is given by
as in a pure exchange economy with the same endowment vector (1, 1, 1) for both consumers. Their preferences are assumed to be represented on this common feasible set by the respective utility functions
There are Pareto efficient allocations characterized by the two equations 
The latter inequality is equivalent to 
Rights to Mediate
Given the feasible allocationt N ∈ A, say that individual i ∈ N has the right to mediate, as well as the right to trade within the set B i ⊂ R G , provided that there is no combination of a v ∈ B i , a set K ⊂ N \ {i} of coalition partners for i, and
Thus, agent i cannot gain by trading the vector v ∈ B i , and then using v to mediate
with coalition partners h ∈ K in a way that leaves every agent in K ∪{i} better off than att N . Equivalently, B i must be disjoint
In the special case when v = 0, such mediation is evidently equivalent to the coalition K ∪ {i} being able to block the allocationt N . Here, however, the blocking coalition is organized by one particular mediating agent i who also has access to the set B i before arranging mutually beneficial transactions.
At first it might seem hard to reconcile equal rights to trade with these rather strong rights to mediate. Yet the following two results show that these combined rights offer a precise characterization of Walrasian equilibrium without transfers. 
Suppose that trader i ∈ N , the set K ⊂ N \ {i} of i's coalition partners, and the 
Because L(t N ) is a linear subspace, one has c = 0 and also p v = 0 for all
, as in the proof of Lemma 3. In particular, pt
. By local non-satiation, the vector 0 is a boundary point of 
